Sacramento Car Accident Lawyer Blog

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this car accident case and its proceedings.)

Mr. White testified in deposition that he had not been in any prior motorcycle accident. (Jones Dec, Exh. 6 at p. 15.) Here, not only is the existence of a possible prior motorcycle accident irrelevant, but plaintiff was not in a prior motorcycle accident. Indeed, Mr. White avoided an accident by spilling off his bike before a car accident occurred. Id., Exh. 3. Thus, it is not impeachment to begin with. Plaintiff need not go to such lengths to address an irrelevant matter.

Independently, Dr. Brown alleges that Plaintiff denied prior motor vehicle accidents in his examination. Id., Exh. 5 at p. 3, 23. What potentially matters to Dr. Brown is the existence of the accidents, which he knows about, not Plaintiff's alleged denials of the accidents. Dr. Brown is a medical expert, not a character witness. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Moreover, nobody's statements during the examination were under oath or recorded by a court recorder. Thus, it is nearly impossible to prove the falsity of Dr. Brown's statement. In fact, to try and disprove Dr. Brown's statements, Plaintiff would be forced to call, among others, his counsel, who attended the examination. If Dr. Brown is allowed to testify as to these alleged denials, a defense medical examiner could literally say anything about conversations with a Plaintiff without fear of reprisal. That is not the law in California.

Continue reading "Sacramento Auto Driver Runs Red Light Causing Motorcylce Collision, Part 5 of 5" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this car accident case and its proceedings.)

Here, none of the prior accidents involved his left knee or nerve damage to his right arm and shoulder, as alleged in this action. Further, the closest prior accident was over two years before the present accident and, thus, remote. Moreover, none of Defendants' experts opine that the prior accidents were a substantial factor in causing his accident injuries. Accordingly, as set forth in Downing, evidence of Mr. White's prior motor vehicle incidents would be irrelevant and certainly be more prejudicial than probative. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

DEFENDANTS CANNOT IMPEACH PLAINTIFF ON AN IRRELEVANT, COLLATERAL MATTER

As also set forth in Downing, defendants cannot attempt to impeach Mr. White's testimony regarding prior motor vehicle incidents as the matters are irrelevant and, therefore, collateral. A party may not cross-examine a witness upon collateral matters for the purpose of eliciting something to be contradicted ... This is especially so where the matter the party seeks to elicit would be inadmissible were it not for the fortuitous circumstance that the witness lied in response to the party's questions. People v. Lavergne (1971) 4 C3d 735, 742; Winfred D. v. Michelin North America, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1030, 1034. Moreover, the Court can disallow such alleged impeachment due to the impeachment's probative value being substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect or its undue consumption of time. Ev.C. § 352; Lavergne, 4 Cal.3d at 742. (See Part 5 of 5.)

Continue reading "Motorcyclist From Sacramento Suffers Multiple Injuries In Auto Collision, Part 4 of 5" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this car accident case and its proceedings.)

ARGUMENT

EVIDENCE OF MR. WHITE’S PRIOR MOTOR VEHICLE INCIDENTS ARE INADMISSIBLE AS IRRELEVANT

Evidence of Mr. White's prior motor-vehicle incidents is inadmissible as they are irrelevant. The general rule regarding inadmissibility of plaintiff's prior accidents was discussed in Downing v. Barrett Mobile Home Transport, Inc. (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 519, 525 when the Court stated:
Generally, evidence that a litigant was involved in a prior accident is inadmissible when its only purported relevance is to show a propensity for negligent acts, thus enhancing the probability of negligence on the occasion in suit. (Prichard v. Veterans Cab. Co., 63 Cal.2d 727 [47 Cal.Rptr. 904, 408 P.2d 360]; Travis v. Southern Pacific Co., 210 Cal.App.2d 410 [26 Cal.Rptr. 700]; George v. Kleinbrodt, 206 Cal.App.2d 224 [23 Cal.Rptr. 822]; Shmatovich v. New Sonoma Creamery, 187 Cal.App.2d 342 [9 Cal.Rptr. 630]; 1 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 199; McCormick on Evidence (2d ed. 1972) § 189; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 350.)

The policy basis of this prohibitory rule rests on the fact that the probative force of this kind of evidence is too slight to overbear the dangers of prejudice, distraction by side issues, and unfair surprise (Wigmore, op. cit.). (8) While evidence of a prior accident is admissible to show that a present physical condition has a cause antecedent to the accident being litigated (Johnson v. Matson Navigation Co., 163 Cal.App.2d 336 [329 P.2d 375]; Browning v. King, supra, 159 Cal.App.2d 326), here there was no reason to admit such evidence; it had no probative value as plaintiff was not claiming kidney damage as a result of this accident. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Continue reading "Sacramento Driver's Prior Car Accidents Not Relevant At Trial, Part 3 of 5" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this car accident case and its proceedings.)

As a result of the Incident, Mr. White suffered from and continues to suffer from various injuries and damages, including, but not limited to, nerve damage down his right shoulder and arm, a partially torn left anterior cruciate ligament, and ongoing meniscus damage in his left knee. (The meniscus is a crescent-shaped cartilage pad between the two joints formed by the femur (the thigh bone) and the tibia (the shin bone).)

Plaintiff already underwent one surgery on his left knee due to his injuries, and his treating orthopedic surgeon opines that Eli, at a minimum, will need ongoing, lifetime care for his knee, will suffer from early onset arthritis, and will need a total knee replacement in his lifetime. Moreover, the nerve damage in his right shoulder and arm is permanent. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Before this Incident, Mr. White was involved in three minor motor vehicle incidents. On or around August 11, 1998, Mr. White ran over a tire in his car. He was seen at University Hospital and diagnosed with a neck and back sprain. (See Declaration of Paul Jones.) On November 14, 2001, Mr. White was rear-ended in his car and felt pain to his left shoulder and lower back. (Jones Decl.) On July 24, 2005, to avoid an accident with a motor vehicle. Mr. White slid off his motorcycle and cut his right hand and bruised his right knee. Id. None of these accidents injured his left knee and/or right arm and shoulder, which are the body parts and injuries at issue in this action.

On May 5, 2009, Mr. White underwent a defense medical examination by Defendants' expert, Michael Brown, M.D. In his report, Dr. Brown claims that Plaintiff "denies any previous motor vehicle accidents." Id., Exh. 5 at p. 3, 23.

Continue reading "Car Accident Leaves Sacramento Man with Severe Nerve Damage, Part 2 of 5" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this car accident case and its proceedings.)

Plaintiff Eli White’s Motion in Limine No. 1: To Exclude Evidence of Prior Accidents

INTRODUCTION

Defendants may attempt to introduce evidence or testimony that Plaintiff Eli White was in motor vehicle/motorcycle accidents before the at-issue accident on November 18, 2008. Such evidence should be excluded because California authority holds that evidence of plaintiffs' prior accidents is inadmissible, generally, and certainly when none of the prior accidents involved the type of injuries at issue in the action. Moreover, impeachment regarding irrelevant and inadmissible prior accidents is improper. As that is precisely the case at present, there should be no evidence or argument regarding any motor vehicle incident Plaintiff was involved in previously. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case involves a November 18, 2008, motor-vehicle incident at a four-way intersection at Broadway and 19th Street in Sacramento, California (the "Incident").

Defendant Lee, heading east on Broadway, approached the intersection facing a stale red light yet blew through the light and into a busy intersection at 25 miles per hour. As he entered the intersection, Plaintiff Eli White, lawfully traveling south on 19th Street on a green light, slammed into the left side of Defendant Lee's automobile in the intersection. Upon impact, Mr. White vaulted over his motorcycle, landed on the hood, and rolled down onto the street. (See Part 2 of 5.)

Continue reading "Sacramento Motorcyclist Injured In Auto Collision, Part 1 of 5" »

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this car accident case and its proceedings.)

U.S. Supreme Court Standard

Wainright v Witt, (1985) 496 US 412 held the standard for exercising a challenge for cause is whether the jury may be "substantially impaired" from following the law. A question of whether the juror can "follow the law" is insufficient to meet this standard. Most jurors try to be fair and most will say that they can follow the law. And, indeed jurors usually use their best efforts to comply with their duties. But, there may be circumstances of a specific case or a specific rule of law in which the juror may try to follow the law, but is impaired from doing so, by virtue of their knowledge, training, experience, or other factors. The parties in personal injury cases are entitled to know about jurors who have no impediments to applying the law as instructed by the court, not jurors who may try and fail to comply.

Trial Counsel Must be Given Latitude to Discover Bias

In considering the challenges for cause, California has detailed provisions for challenges. There are three grounds for a challenge for cause: 1) general disqualification, which disqualifies the juror from serving in the action on trial; 2) implied bias, as, when the existence of the facts as ascertained, in judgment of law disqualifies the juror; or 3) actual bias, when a state of mind exists on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party. (CCP §225, (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(1)(c). For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

A challenge for implied bias may be taken for one or more of the following causes:

(e) Having an unqualified opinion or belief as to the merits of the action founded upon knowledge of its material facts or of some of them.

(f) The existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity against, or bias towards, either party. (CCP §229.)

Continue reading "Jurors' Background And Biases Fair Game In Sacramento Car Accident Case, Part 3 of 3" »

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this car accident case and its proceedings.)

Scope of Requested Voir Dire

The scope of questioning has to accomplish the goal of a "fair and impartial jury" in this personal injury matter, which may involve numerous issues. Although CCP §222.5 permits the court to impose some limits, the statute specifically requires that the court take into account: any unique or complex elements, legal or factual, in the case and the individual responses or conduct of jurors which may evince attitudes inconsistent with suitability to serve as a fair and impartial juror in the particular case.

(California Code of Civil Procedure) section 222.5 grants counsel in a civil trial the right to conduct "oral examination of prospective jurors to enable them to exercise both peremptory and for cause" challenges. The scope of such examination may be restricted by the trial court within reasonable limits that allow counsel liberal and probing examination to discover bias and prejudice within the circumstances of each case. Bly-Magee v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 318, 324. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Time Restrictions

CCP §222.5 specifically prohibits arbitrary time limits: Specific unreasonable or arbitrary time limits shall not be imposed. In the past, some local and state court rules sought to impose time limits. However, this rule has long ago been withdrawn.

Continue reading "Sacramento Car Accident Trial Presents Constitutional Issues, Part 2 of 3" »

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this car accident case and its proceedings.)

Plaintiff's Trial Brief on Jury Voir Dire: Personal Injury Case

California Law Provides for the Intelligent Exercise of Peremptory Challenges

Plaintiff, Hank Choo, by and through his attorney of record, hereby requests the right to have an adequate voir dire conducted by counsel. California Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter CCP) §222.5. provides that following examination by the court:

"...counsel for each party shall have the right to examine, by oral and direct questioning, any of the prospective jurors in order to enable counsel to intelligently exercise both peremptory challenges and challenges for cause."

Since the purpose of voir dire is intended to select a fair and impartial jury in civil trials (CCP §222.5), the statute provides:

"During any examination conducted by counsel for the parties, the trial judge should permit liberal and probing examination calculated to discover bias or prejudice with regard to the circumstances of the particular case." For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Because of the need for follow up questions, justice may on occasion require counsel to cover the same subject or similar questions to those posed by the court. CCP §222.5 recognizes this fact, and states: The fact that a topic has been included in the judge's examination should not preclude additional non-repetitive or non-duplicative questioning in the same area by counsel.

Continue reading "Jury Selection Issues Arise In Sacramento Car Accident Trial, Part 1 of 3" »

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this car accident case and its proceedings.)

Officer Smith's Traffic Collision Report Should Be Excluded

Vehicle Code §20013 sets forth the rule regarding the admissibility of police reports. It states in pertinent part: "No such accident report shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal arising out of an accident ... "

In Box v. California Date Growers Association (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 266, the court applied Vehicle Code §20013 when it properly excluded the officer's police report following a motorcycle versus truck accident. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision that the Highway Patrol Officer's traffic report was not admissible. Thus, in the present case Officer Smith's Traffic Collision Report should be excluded in its entirety pursuant to Vehicle Code §20013 and the above-cited authority. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Highway Patrol Officer Smith Is Not A Qualified Expert Witness And His Testimony Lacks Foundation

California Evidence Code §720 states: (a) A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates. Against the objection of a party, such special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education must be shown before the witness may testify as an expert.

In the present case, defendants have not demonstrated a foundation that Officer Smith has special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject of automobile ownership. Further, there is no foundation of reliability of information the officer used to form the opinion stated. Thus, any testimony on this subject by Officer Smith should be excluded because he is not qualified to testify as an expert on this subject.

Continue reading "Admissibility Of CHP Collision Report Challenged In Sacramento Car Accident Case, Part 3 of 3" »

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this car accident case and its proceedings.)

Likewise, in the present case, any conclusions reached by the police officer who investigated the accident should not be allowed by this court. More specifically, the officer's opinions and conclusions in the police report or in the form of testimony should not be allowed.

In Francis v. Sauve (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 102, the court analyzed the issue in greater detail. The court reiterated that a police officer may testify as to the point of impact when his opinion is based upon percipient observations. The court discussed its refusal to admit into evidence expert opinions in traffic accident cases where the factors involved are too varying and too indefinite to constitute the basis of an opinion, such as the probable course of the cars after impact (Fishman v. Silva (1931) 116 Cal.App. 1). For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Moreover, this issue was litigated during the State Farm's motion for summary adjudication, which was denied. The defense attempted to have the issue of whether there was insurance coverage decided by the California Highway Patrol officer. State Farm's UMF #6 and plaintiff's objection:

6. Officer David Smith determined at the scene of the accident that Plaintiff Hank Choo is the owner of the 2000 Range Rover driven by plaintiff.

6. Objection: Police officer's determination of ownership is irrelevant. Waller v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 747, 755

Continue reading "Sacramento Automobile Driver Rear-Ended In Highway Accident, Part 2 of 3" »

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this car accident case and its proceedings.)

Plaintiff' Hank Choo’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Opinion Evidence of Highway Patrol Officer and Traffic Collision Report, and Limitation of Testimony at Trial

Plaintiff requests of the court an order in limine prohibiting the attorneys for all parties offering evidence of, or making any reference to, any conclusions and/or opinions referred to in the Traffic Collision Report generated by Highway Patrol Officer David Smith.

Preliminary Statement

This action arises from an automobile accident that occurred on August 9, 2008, when the defendant crashed her vehicle into the rear of a 2000 Range Rover plaintiff was driving. Plaintiff anticipates that defendants will attempt to introduce evidence of Highway Patrol Officer Smith's opinion that plaintiff Hank Choo was the owner of the 2000 Range Rover. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Opinions In Police Reports Or Elicited By Way Of Testimony Are Inadmissible

It is well settled that as a general rule opinions of police officers should not be admitted in automobile accident cases. Waller v. Southern California Gas Company (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 747. In Waller, the court correctly disallowed the opinion of the police officer as to whether which party, if any, had violated the right of way.

Continue reading "Sacramento Car Accident Leaves Man With Catastrophic Injuries, Part 1 of 3" »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this car accident case and its proceedings.)

Victor Lee was convicted in Miami, Florida in 1978 of felony drug possession. There have been no subsequent felonies. Defendants respectfully request that any evidence of or reference to defendant Lee’s 30-year-old conviction is only intended to mislead and prejudice the jury, and convey irrelevant character evidence, and should thus be prohibited from mention. This conviction is three decades old and has no bearing on Mr. Lee’s credibility today, thirty years after the fact. Mr. Lee has been straightforward in his testimony about the motor vehicle accident in which he was involved in this case. There is no similarity between the conduct involved in the felony offense and the conduct of Mr. Lee alleged in this case. For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Reference to or the introduction of evidence of this remote felony conviction has no probative value and would be highly prejudicial to defendants in that it would unfairly convey the impression that Mr. Lee’s conviction in the early 1970s is relevant to his character today and of his conduct in the subject motor vehicle accident. And would undoubtedly mislead and confuse the jury into believing that such evidence would somehow be probative of the ultimate issues in this case. Further, the introduction of such evidence would require time-consuming rebuttal by defendants.

Continue reading "Defendant Fights Admission Of Prior Felony In Sacramento Car Accident Lawsuit, Part 3 of 3" »

The following blog entry is written from a defendant’s position as trial approaches. Reviewing this kind of briefing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this car accident case and its proceedings.)

THE COURT SHOULD EXCLUDE EVIDENCE THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF WHICH IS SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED BY ITS PREJUDICIAL IMPACT OR HAS THE RISK OF MISLEADING OR CONFUSING THE JURY

Evidence Code section 352 gives the Court discretion to exclude evidence if its admission will necessitate the undue consumption of time, or if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a substantial danger of undue prejudice, confusion of issues and misleading the jury. (Evidence Code §352.) Pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, the court should weigh the probative value of proffered evidence against the probability that it will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice. (People v. Murphy (1979) 8 Cal.3d 359.) If the Court finds that the probative value of the proffered evidence is weak and a danger of undue prejudice is strong, then it should rule that such evidence is inadmissible. (People v. Stanley (1967) 167 Cal.2d 812.) For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

There are a number of different factors with which to determine the strength or weakness of the probative value of evidence. Among the factors which the court should consider are the following:

Its materiality;
The strength of its relationship to the issue upon which it is offered;
Whether it goes to a main issue or merely a collateral one; and
Whether it is necessary to prove the proponents case or merely cumulative to other available and sufficient proof.

(Burke v. Almaden Vineyards, Inc. (1978) 86 Cal. App.2d 750.)

Continue reading "Sacramento Bus Driver Catastrophically Injures Rental Car Driver, Part 2 of 3" »