Through the present, Diane Cash continues to treat with Dr. S. and Dr. C. and continues to receive counseling from Dr. Y., for her injuries sustained in the bus accident of February 6, 2005. Additionally, as prescribed and instructed by Dr. S., Ms. Cash receives cognitive, speech, physical and occupational therapy. Diane Cash remains disabled by her injuries through the present time.

Medical bills to date total in excess of $50,000.00.

Plaintiff's counsel has retained the services of Life Care Planner, Carol H.. Plaintiff anticipates future expenses for medication and transportation or attendant care in excess of $20,000 per year.

C. Future Medical Expenses.
Diane Cash continues to receive cognitive retraining, physical therapy and speech therapy at St Luke’s Hospital. The monthly charges for this therapy are as follows:

Cognitive retraining $186.00
Physical therapy $186.00
Speech therapy $294.00
TOTAL: $666.00

Ongoing medical expenses, including medication, reduced to present cash value, are anticipated to be $507,000.00.

In 2006, Diane Cash continued to treat with Drs. S. and C., and continued counseling with Dr. Y., for her continuing injuries sustained in the bus accident. In Interrogatory Responses of January 19, 2006, Diane Cash described her continuing symptoms as follows:

Response to Interrogatory 6.4:
Plaintiff continues to have the following: loss of balance, nausea, vomiting, dizziness, impaired speech, disorientation, blurred vision, to be emotionally labile, memory loss, decreased mentation, passivity, difficulty making decisions, loss of confidence, depression, difficulty walking, preclusion from driving. Plaintiff also continues to have pain and/or discomfort at the top of his head, forehead and behind her eyes, and in her back, right foot, and right shoulder (including an area underneath the clavicle).

Diane Cash remained disabled by her injuries in 2006. She continued to take medication prescribed by Dr. S., for vertigo, nausea, depression and pain. She was referred for speech therapy in 2005, continuing into 2006. Ms. Cash used a cane and/or a walker to ambulate, and received some home health care from Professional Health Care providers.

On October 24, 2006, neurologist Dr. S., plaintiff's primary treating physician for her injuries, described his continuing treatment of Diane Cash as follows: "Ms. Cash was referred to me for monitoring of treatment of brain damage sustained in a bus accident where her head hit the ground. Ms. Cash’s symptoms of physical brain damage include headache, vertigo, nausea, vomiting, loss of balance, blurred vision, memory loss, decreased mental ability and comprehension, and impaired speech. I have treated Diane Cash for these symptoms for the last one-and-a-half years. Ms. Cash’s symptoms are within the acknowledged range of symptoms caused by brain damage.

In June 2005, Dr. Y. recommended to Dr. S. that Diane Cash be evaluated by a neuropsychologist in order to assess the extent of cognitive impairment resulting from the brain damage. In addition to continuing to treat with Dr. S., Dr. C. and Dr. Y., as instructed, Ms. Cash obtained a neuropsychological examination from James W., Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, beginning in August 2005. The neuropsychological evaluation, completed in early 2006, revealed, on the basis of extensive testing, that Ms. Cash had sustained brain damage resulting in considerable loss of cognitive function. Dr. W. also concluded, on the basis of the administered testing, that Ms. Cash’s anxiety and mild to moderate depression, experienced following the bus collision, were sequelae of physical injury to the brain, and not of psychopathology.

Dr. W. declared under oath as follows: The extensive neuropsychological testing conducted during the evaluation of Diane Cash evidenced that Ms. Cash sustained acute physical injury to the brain. The organic brain damage sustained by Ms. Cash has resulted in significant loss of cognitive function. Additionally, as a result of the physical injury to the brain, Ms. Cash suffers from decreased memory, inability to concentrate, mental fatigue, anxiety, irritability, mild to moderate depression, vertigo, stammering, stuttering, blurred vision and headache.

On Monday, February 9, 2005, Diane Cash obtained further treatment for her bus collision injuries from her primary care physician, Kerry C., M.D., in Sacramento. Dr. C. reported the bus accident, and he noted complaints of nausea, rib pain and cervical radiculopathy. At her re-examination on February 17, 2005, Ms. Cash continued to have head pain, to feel slow and confused, as well as having continued neck and back pain. Dr. C. believed that Ms. Cash was suffering from post-concussion syndrome, and he ordered a CT Scan of Ms.Cash’s head and neck.

Diane Cash returned as instructed for further examination by Dr. C. on March 1, 12, 15, 22 and 29, 2005. Ms. Cash continued to have constant right-sided headache, where her head struck the pavement the pain was only slightly relieved by medication. She continued to feel slow and drowsy, and to have blurred vision. There was related neck, right shoulder, knee and right heel pain. Dr. C.’s diagnosis was of post-concussion syndrome with attendant concern for traumatic head injury. Dr. C. prescribed physical therapy and referred Ms. Cash for consultation for head injury to a neurologist, Roberta S., M.D.

On April 5, 2005, Diane Cash was examined by Board Certified Neurologist, Roberta S., M.D. Dr. S. reported bifrontal and occipital headaches, blurred vision, positional imbalance, slow thinking and reduced memory, as well as low back, hip, right side, knee and heel pain. The physical complaints of heel pain improved somewhat since the time of the collision. Ms. Cash was taking Neurontin, Flexeril, and Ibuprofen as prescribed. Dr. S.'s diagnosis was of post-traumatic head syndrome, with reduced memory, slowed mentation, positional vertigo and post-traumatic headache, and paraspinal thoracic and lumbar strains. Dr. S. prescribed continued Neurontin and Ibuprofen, and advised Dr. C. that Ms. Cash would continue to be disabled from her job as an architect, at least through June 1, 2005.

DAMAGES

A. Physical Injuries.
The bus struck Diane Cash from the left, as she walked eastbound on Campus Commons Road across University Avenue. Ms. Cash fell and hit her head and her right side on the street pavement. Her first recollection is of waking up and lying on wet pavement, staring at the headlights of the bus. She was disoriented and felt like she was going to die. As she laid on the ground, she heard her friend, with whom she had been speaking on her cell phone, calling out to her. Ms. Cash dragged herself in the direction of her friend’s voice. She felt for her cell phone and found it nearby on the pavement. She was able to call 911.

The Sacramento Fire Department responded to the emergency, assisted Ms. Cash, and the medics reported a chief complaint of head pain. Ms. Cash was transported by ambulance to Mercy General in Sacramento.

At Mercy, Ms. Cash was found to have headache, head contusion and cephalic (head) hematoma, in addition to right shoulder, right leg, and back pain. The examining physician stated: There was questionable loss of consciousness although the patient states she felt disoriented. X-rays were taken of the cervical and lumbar spine. The clinical impression, was as follows:

CLINICAL IMPRESSION:

1. Acute motor vehicle accident.
2. Closed head trauma without acute loss of consciousness secondary to number 1.
3. Cervical/lumbar strain secondary to number one.

According to the police report concerning the bus-pedestrian collision, Diane Cash was approximately two-thirds of the way across the intersection at the time of impact. The impact knocked her to the ground, and her head struck the pavement.

Prior to the collision, defendant Terry James, driving the University bus on its regular route, was traveling westbound on University Avenue. According to defendant James, he came to a stop at the limit line for the stop sign at Campus Commons Road, and then began executing his left turn onto University Avenue. While executing his turn, James saw a shadow in front of his bus which he later determined to be Diane Cash. Defendant James testified that he struck Ms. Cash with the right front portion of the bus.

The investigating officer determined that the primary collision factor was a violation on the part of defendant James of California Vehicle Code Section 21950(a) (failure to yield to a pedestrian within a marked crosswalk). Defendant University investigated the circumstances of the collision, and it concluded that driver James was at fault, and that the accident chargeable to driver James’s record.

At the scene, driver James did not mention any equipment failures to the investigating police officer. At deposition, however, defendant James testified that the windshield wipers on the University bus were not functioning at the time of the collision. Further discovery confirmed that the windshield wipers, and possibly the defroster system on the bus, had not been functioning for a period of at least several days before the collision.

PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE AND PARTIES

This is a personal injury action for damages sustained by plaintiff Diane Cash when she was struck by a University bus in a crosswalk on February 6, 2005, in Sacramento. Defendant Terry James was the driver of the University bus that struck Diane Cash. At the time of the collision, defendant Terry James was acting within the course and scope of his employment for the defendant University. The bus operated by defendant Terry James at the time of the collision was owned and maintained by defendant University.

LIABILITY

Diane Cash is a 41-year-old senior architect, who has worked for a prominent architecture and design firm for 15 years. She has served as president, vice president and secretary of the local professional architects society with approximately 225 members. She has a degree in architecture from U.C. Berkeley, a residence in El Dorado Hills and numerous friends.

On the evening of February 6, 2005, Diane Cash was walking across Campus Commons Road at University Avenue in Sacramento, on her way to dinner when she was struck by the bus. The intersection is illuminated by street lights. Ms. Cash was using her cell phone, which she held in her right hand. It was raining and Ms. Cash also held an open umbrella, with her left hand. Diane Cash is legally blind in her left eye.

Mr. Sunderland sued both Mr. Mazloom and his employer, Lockheed. The appellate court
held Mr. Sunderland was in the course and scope of his employment, noting the following:

1. Mr. Mazloom drove his own vehicle.
2. Lockheed did not pay Mr. Mazloom a mileage allowance while he worked in Lancaster.
3. Mr. Mazloom had already cleared out his office. Thus, his work for Lockheed was finished.
4. Mr. Mazloom made the trip to the fast food restaurant to get food. Thus, it was not a trip that had a mix of personal and business purposes.
5. The trip to In-N-Out Burger had no benefit to Lockheed.
6. Finally, the Court noted that Lockheed had “no control over Mazloom’s choice of
transportation generally, or over his movements at the time he collided with plaintiff’s
vehicle.”

The facts in the present case of Gibbs v.ABC, are critically different and thus require a different
result from the one reached in Sunderland.

1. Unlike Sunderland, Ms. Smythe’s vehicle was provided and paid for by her employer, ABC.
2. Unlike Sunderland, ABC paid for Ms. Smythe’s travel expenses.
3. Unlike Sunderland, Ms. Smythe was in the middle of a multi-day business trip for the benefit of ABC. Mr. Mazloom had already “cleared out his office,” whereas Ms. Smythe was expected by her boss to continue working for ABC in California the day following her collision with plaintiff John Gibbs.

Further, personal acts that are “necessary to the comfort, convenience, health, and welfare of the employee while at work” are minor deviations and do not take the employee out of the course and scope of employment. O’Connor v. McDonald’s Restaurants (1990) 220 Cal. App. 3d 25, 30.
For example, in Lazar v. Thermal Equipment (1983) 148 Cal. App. 3d 458, 466-467, the court held that an employee’s decision to stop at a grocery store on the way home from work, even though the store was in the opposite direction than his normal route home, did not remove him from the course and scope of his employment. The court further held the detour was foreseeable because the employee was using a company vehicle to complete his work.
The Lazar court went on to say:

It is the established rule in this jurisdiction that where the servant is combining his own business with that of his master, or attending to both at substantially the same time, no nice inquiry will be made as to which business the servant was actually engaged in when the third person was injured…” (Lazar, supra, at pp. 467-468.)

IV. DEFENDANT'S RELIANCE ON SUNDERLAND v. LOCKHEED IS MISPLACED

In its argument that Nancy Smythe was not in the scope of her employment with
ABC at the time of the collision, defendant relies exclusively on the decision of Sunderland v.
Lockheed (2005) 130 CA4th 1. Defendant’s reliance on Sunderland, supra, is misplaced, and
is easily distinguished from the case at bar.

First it should be noted that the application, evaluation and weighing of these factors cannot possibly be conducted without the court making factual determinations and weighing evidence, a process incompatible with summary adjudication.

In O’Connor v. McDonald’s Restaurant, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d 25 plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by a McDonald’s employee. The employee had voluntarily returned to the restaurant one evening from 8:00 p.m. until 1:00 or 2:00 a.m. in order to do extra cleaning and preparation for a “spring blitz” competition. The employee voluntarily contributed his extra time with a goal of receiving a promotion. He then traveled from McDonald’s to a co-workers house where he socialized until about 6:30 a.m. The accident occurred when he was traveling from the co-worker’s house to his own house. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of McDonald’s, finding that he was on a special errand for McDonald’s when he voluntarily reported for cleanup duties, but that the stop at the co-worker’s house was a “complete departure” from the special errand and McDonald’s responsibility for his driving therefore terminated before the accident occurred. The court of appeal disagreed, and after applying the factors set forth in Felix v. Asai, concluded that there was a triable issue of material facts as to whether the trip to the co-worker’s house constituted a complete departure from the special errand. O’Connor v. McDonald’s Restaurants of California, Inc. Supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at 33-34.

In applying the factors set forth by the court in Felix v. Asai, the inescapable conclusion is that there is a clear nexus between Smythe’s arrival at the site of the accident and her work for ABC.

Where the employee “is combining his own business with that of his master, or attending to both at substantially the same time, no nice inquiry will be made as to which business the servant was actually engaged in when a third person was injured.” Miller v. Stouffer (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 70, 78. “If the main purpose of his activity is still the employer’s business, it does not cease to be within the scope of the employment by reason of incidental personal acts, slight delays, or deflections from the most direct route. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. V. Haight (1988) 205 Cal,App.3d 223, 243. Under such circumstances, the employer will face respondent superior liability “unless it clearly appears that the servant could not have been directly or indirectly serving his master.” Miller v. Stouffer, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at 78 citing Loper v. Morrison (1944) 23 Cal.2d 600, 606.

Even if not motivated by a desire to serve the employer, conduct is nevertheless within the course and scope of employment if there is a sufficient causal nexus between the conduct at issue and the employment. Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 298. A sufficient causal nexus exists where the conduct at issue is “generated by or an outgrowth of work place responsibilities, conditions or events.” Id. at 302.

6. ABC had the Right to Terminate Smythe at Will
One of the most critical factors has been determined to be the right of the employer to end the service of the employee whenever he sees fit. Press Pub Co. supra, 190 Cal. at 120. Here, there is no doubt that Chan had the authority to terminate Smythe at will. (See Fact No. 14)
Each and every factor outlined in the Restatement 2d of Agency dictates a conclusion that the true relationship between Smythe and ABC from April 2006 through and including the date of the accident at issue here, was one of employer/employee and not one of independent contractor. Because of the financial status of the company, a unique agreement was arrived at between Smythe and Chan, and Smythe was not placed on payroll. Nonetheless, the fact that she was engaged full-time, that she was charged with a wide variety of tasks and duties for the benefit of the company rather than hired for a specific project, the fact that Chan could and did dictate what she was to do and how she was to do it, and the fact that ABC provided her with all instrumentalities necessary for doing the work and, perhaps most importantly, that ABC held her out as president and COO all constitute traits of an employer-employee relationship and not one of independent contractor.
3. SMYTHE WAS IN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF HER EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT

An employer is vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its employees committed while the employee is in the course and scope of his or her employment. Rodgers v. Kemper Construction Company (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 608, 617. The policy is based on an economic rational, with the goal being to place the cost of losses caused by the torts of employees that occur within the conduct of the employer’s enterprise upon the business itself, as a required cost of doing business. Hinman v. Westinghouse Electric Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 956, 959-960.

5. The Parties were Operating as Employer/Employee
One of the factors to be evaluated is how the parties saw the nature of the relationship between them. Smythe had no doubt that she was an employee of ABC. The employment of 2006 was substantially the same as the previous employment between 2000 and 2002. (See Fact No. 5) In her opinion, Chan was her immediate superior who could dictate her activities, and if Smythe disobeyed Chan it would constitute insubordination and subject her to termination. (See Fact Nos. 6, 13, 14, 15, 16) She was working full-time (See Fact No. 25, 29) and during both periods of employment had a company credit card, company office, cell phone, laptop, email account and voicemail. (See Fact No. 27) She had transitioned into a long term, full-time position as President and COO, and she was held out as such by Chan. (See Fact No. 20, 21, 25) Certainly in Smythe’s mind she was a long term employee of ABC. (See Fact No. 24, 25)
Although Chan does not describe Smythe as an employee, she admits that Smythe was introduced as President (See Fact No. 20, 21), directed the work of others (See Fact No. 19) and had a role in hiring, firing, and expending corporate funds. (See Fact No. 31)

While it certainly may be true that outside consultants are sometimes hired on a project basis to fill a particular role that the company cannot fill in-house or to provide short-term outside consulting services, such is not the case with the employment of Smythe. As discussed below, she was working full-time for ABC and had no other clients. (See Fact No. 29) She was dedicating her full time efforts to advancing the objectives of the company. She was being held out to customers, potential customers and employees as the president of the company and was filling that role. She was involved in organizational efforts, setting and directing the objectives of the company, assisting with marketing and representing the company at conferences. This is not the traditional role of a consultant, and, in fact, it would be highly unorthodox for a company president to be an outside consultant. Rather than reflecting a true intent to retain Smythe as an independent contractor, the situation she was in with Smythe at the time of the accident was arrived at solely due to economic concerns and a desire to find a structure that would be economically best for both parties. (See Fact No. 26) Where all indicia are to the contrary, the court should, and must, ignore the “Independent Contractor” label assigned by the parties. Toyota, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at 877.
3. ABC Supplies All Instrumentalities
At the time of the accident giving rise to this action, ABC was being supplied with all instrumentalities necessary to carry on her work for the benefit of ABC, including an office, an email account, a cell phone, voicemail, a computer and a company credit card. (See Fact No. 27) In addition, when she attended the conference in northern California, her expenses were paid by ABC, which provided him with a rental car, corporate housing and a local office in which to work. (See Fact No. 28)
Again, contrary to what would be expected with an independent consultant, ABC provided Smythe everything it would provide any other traditional employee to carry on the work of the company.

2. Type of Business and SMYTHE’s Role in the Business
The Restatement (2d) sets forth several factors with overlapping analyses under the present facts, including (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill required in the particular occupation; (h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the employer; and (j) whether the principal is or is not in business. Therefore, these will be addressed together.

ABC is a business which provides manufacturing and software solutions for a variety of industries. It employs programmers to develop software. (See Fact No. 17) The organizational structure had a Board of Directors at the top, followed by Victoria Chan, the CEO, followed by Smythe, who was the “acting” president. (See Fact No. 18) Smythe and four others reported to Chan. (See Fact No. 19) Smythe also had authority over four other employees in the company. (See Fact No. 19)

Smythe was given the title of president and was authorized to introduce herself to others as president. (See Fact No.20) Victoria Chan introduced Smythe to customers, potential customers and employees as the president of the company. (See Fact No. 21) Business cards that were in the process of being ordered at the time of the accident, but were never printed, identified Smyhte as the President and Chief Operating Officer. (See Fact No. 22)